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Abstract
In the Common Law system judges have the power to create subsidiary laws: they make rules in strict 
sense. This Kind of power responds to a special way in which the Common Law develops and adapts 
itself to achieve the best rules for a given society. Understanding how the Australian law system works, 
as an example of a common law structure, and how judges interact with the parliament in the creation 
of the best rules of law -which makes the process coherent- is paramount for other legal systems that 
have a mixture of legal institutions from both civil and common law systems, as Colombia. Colombia 
has an unclear mixture of law systems, which generates an uncertainty of the application of the law 
producing both by judges and parliament, and serious structural law problems; so, understanding the 
basis of the common law system it is important to clarify the limits in the competence of each authority 
and the interaction between the law made by the Parliament and the one that the judges produce.
Keywords: Law-making, Rule of Law, Parliamentary Supremacy, Step-by-step Development of Law, 
Sudden Development of Law, Division of Powers, Precedent, Authority, Legitimacy, Limits.
Resumen
Dentro del Sistema del Common Law, existe una potestad de creación legal (o de reglas de conducta) 
dada a los jueces. Dicha potestad responde a la forma especial en como el Common Law se desarrolla 
y adapta a sí mismo para lograr las mejores reglas para una determinada sociedad. El entender cómo 
funciona dicho Sistema, partiendo del ejemplo Australiano, y como dicho sistema es coherente a pesar 
de tener más de una autoridad que genera normas de conducta, es de suma importancia para otros 
sistemas jurídicos que tienen una mixtura de instituciones jurídicas, como en el caso colombiano, 
en donde la importación de las mismas va en detrimento del sistema. Colombia tiene una mixtura 
de sistemas jurídicos que genera una incertidumbre sobre la aplicación de la ley produciendo serios 
problemas estructurales; por ello, entender las bases del Common Law es importante para aclarar los 
límites de competencia de las distintas autoridades y la interacción entre la ley creada por el Parlamento 
y aquella producida por los jueces.
Palabras clave: Potestad Legislativa, Estado de Derecho, Supremacía Parlamentaria, Desarrollo Legis-
lativo Paso a Paso, Desarrollo Legislativo Repentino, División de Poderes, Precedentes Judiciales, 
Legitimidad, Límites.
Introduction
Under the division of power theory, in 
Australia, the task of ‘law making’ was given 
to Parliament. Therefore, Judge’s task was to 
apply the law, interpret the law, and to ensure 
that justice is spread over specific cases and as a 
consequence of that process, formulate a rule of 
the law in the absence of a statute. This division 
of tasks was implicit in the Australian Constitu-
tion (Dixon, 1942). 
The term “law making” is not a technical legal 
term and is only part of the tasks assigned to 
legislative powers around the globe. Therefore, 
the Australian Constitution charges parliament 
with the law making power, but does not prohibit 
judges from creating behavioral rules under a 
Common Law system (Australia, 1955). 
In order to adopt a suitable definition of the 
‘law making’ task, this paper departs from two 
common definitions of law and a definition of 
jurisprudence. Afterwards explains what ‘law 
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making’ actually means (Gallego, 2014; Guarín, 
2013).
In this context, law could be understood as 
a “body of enacted or customary rules recog-
nized by the community as binding”, (Allen, 
1990) as well as “the subject matter of the disci-
pline of jurisprudence” (Butt, 2010). At the same 
time, Jurisprudence can be understood to be “the 
theory of law; the study of the principles of law 
and legal system and their fundamental philo-
sophical basis” (Butt, 2010). 
In this order of ideas, ‘law making’ in this paper 
will be understood as the creation of binding rules 
of behavior that the society must obey, even if it is 
done by the legislative power or via jurisprudence 
(judges). That creation of law and the modifica-
tions of it, occurs sometimes suddenly or under a 
step-by step process, no matter if it’s done by the 
Parliament or by other institution.
In this context, despite is not openly recog-
nize that judges can create law and the Australian 
Constitutions does not give them this duty 
expressly, when Judges create binding rules of 
law, via jurisprudence, in the form of precedents, 
they are in fact making laws. “Most common law 
judges today accept that it is an inevitable inci-
dent of the judicial process that, from time to 
time, a judge has to make, and not merely declare 
or restate, legal rules and principles.” (McHugh, 
1988)
As a result, Common Law can be seen as “a 
set or code of rules which have been laid down by 
somebody or other, and which owe their statutes 
as law to the fact that they have been laid down 
so” (Simpson, 1986) (Eisenberg, 2007). The law 
that is made by the judges is the first step of this 
laying down process (Williams, 2006).
A relevant point that should be made is that 
the Australian Constitution was not a product of 
revolution, but of a colony’s desire to conform a 
nation that was united under a federal system. 
(Williams, 2006) Therefore, the Constitution was 
based on all the local legal traditions, focused on 
regulating only the federal system, and it created 
the federal organisms that shape the Nation. As 
such, the Constitution did not change the powers 
invested in judges relating to the creation of 
legally binding precedents.
In this order of ideas, existing law making 
competences given to different authorities, it 
is vital to the coherence of the Australian legal 
system and the way of how the law is teached. 
Only under a system with strong institutions as 
the “BARS” the rule of law and the respect of the 
precedent can function correctly, because the 
young mind can understood the reasons why the 
precedent is the best rule of law for the society 
and why change it without enough analysis can 
generate a systemically instability and distrust in 
the judiciary power.
This research does not intend to conduct a 
comparative study between the Civil Law and 
the Common Law. Consequently, being an anal-
ysis of the institutions of a foreign system, will 
approach the legal creation from a qualitative 
approach, analyzing the way in which judges 
produce laws based on the Australian Political 
Constitution, in order to contrast this figure with 
the existing doctrine. Then, through the deduc-
tive method and the in-depth study of the limits 
to legal creation, we will obtain enough concep-
tual elements to clarify this special prerogative 
as a source of analysis or comparison for other 
systems.
Division of powers and differences in the 
law making function between judges and 
Parliament in the Australian legal system
To understand the law making power under 
the Australian Common Law, it is necessary first 
to understand how Parliamentary sovereignty 
works in that system, considering the historical 
evolution of it; under that perspective the Parlia-
ment legislative power “in its broadest form (...) 
acknowledges no limits to the legislative power 
which can be exercised by the Parliament, which 
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in theory can override both executive and judicial 
action” (Saunders, 1989).
This power comes from the principle of 
representation, whose justification rest on the 
limitations created by the people to the ancient 
power that the kings used to have. Congressmen, 
as representatives of the people, were invested 
with the great power to administer the State and 
to create binding rules that control and limit the 
community’s freedom. (Saunders, 1989) In this 
context, Parliamentary supremacy is recognized 
by the Australian Constitution (Australia, 1955).
Therefore, “Judges only had a supplementary 
role in the creation of binding rules, when there 
was not applicable statute”, (Saunders, 1989, 
p. 297) “under the common law system of adju-
dication, courts not only resolve disputes but 
formulate rules and principles that can be used to 
decide comparable cases” (McHugh, 1988). In this 
order of ideas, the primary function of the judi-
cial power is to interpret the law and apply it to a 
specific case in order to uphold justice and, doing 
so, create the best rule of conduct for the society, 
only when there is not a statute
Consequently, the rules created by the judges 
are governed by different principles and strong 
limitations (David Wood, 1995, p. 47) because 
they cannot “usurp policy-making functions 
conferred on the executive [and legislative]” (Allan, 
2004, p. 294). Concluding, judges cannot formu-
late public policy when they are creating the best 
rule of law.
The supplementary judge’s role in law making 
implies that the tribunals have to apply older 
authorities to similar cases in order to main-
tain the coherence of the system, unless they 
have strong reasons to challenge that specific 
authority, supported by a change of the social 
premises (Allan, 2004).
Concluding, Judges cannot create a public 
policy and ‘make law’ according to it. As the 
judges are appointed by the executive and not 
elected by the people, (Australia, 1955) they are 
not representatives of the people’s will. They are 
only able to make a rule that applies in specific 
and similar cases (González, 2014; Sanger, 2015).
Importance of the reports in the Common 
Law
Common Law systems are not familiar with 
the codification process, understood as a compi-
lation of laws under a unique text or code of an 
specific matter. This is one of the main differ-
ences between the Civil and the Common Law 
system, because the first are based on codes. 
Therefore it is paramount for the Common law 
systems to have some place or text where the 
applicable authorities appear, “The importance 
of the reports, as the keepers of the precedents, is 
paramount to the coherence of the system and the 
knowledge of the rules of law, in contrast with the 
statutes publicity methods” (Dawson, 1968, p. 80).
The task of the report is “to ensure that these 
oral comments are reduced to readable English”. 
(Dawson, 1968, p. 83) Although even there is no 
codification in Common Law, it is possible to find 
the applicable precedents or the rules of conduct 
in those texts in the form of Courts’ decisions, 
because not all cases go into the legal reports but 
those important for the community. (Dawson, 
1968, p. 84) Consequently, the relevant precedent 
can be found easily and it is the Courts responsi-
bility the publication of the cases and the correct 
writing of them (Dawson, 1968, p. 87). 
Differences in the creation of binding 
rules by judges
As seen before, there are two main different 
types of rules in the Common Law system. Since 
Parliament makes the law following parliamen-
tary procedure (bill, debates, vote, etc.), judges 
generate rules of law in an unconventional way. 
This special kind of law is product of the stare 
decisis doctrine (doctrine of the binding prece-
dent) (Rheinstein, 1952, p. 96) in which similar 
cases must be decided upon in the same way 
in order to preserve the legal coherence and 
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stability. (Rheinstein, 1952, p. 65) “However, even 
the decisions of the courts are final and generate a 
binding rule, the Parliament can change it” under 
the parliament supremacy principle (Dawson, 
1968, p. 91).
The principle of stare decisis implies that, 
under the Court hierarchy, the lower Courts 
and judges must respect and apply the prece-
dent generated by a higher Court and only, in 
exception, they can decide away from a prece-
dent (MacAdam, 1998, p. 64) However the lower 
Courts are binding only by the ratio of those cases 
which are the authority but not by the obiter dicta 
(Kirby, 2007, p. 245). 
“The binding precedent can be found in the 
ratio decidendi which is the reason that the 
Court gave to solve the case, in contrast with 
the obiter dicta which are the other elements 
necessary to take the decision” (MacAdam, 
1998, p. 66). 
In Justice Michael Kirby’s words 
“the ratio must be derived from the essen-
tial areas of agreement legally necessary to 
the decision, found within the reasons of the 
judges in the majority” (Kirby, 2007, p. 245).
Finally, The Highest Court is the One in charge 
of generating the law, since the cases that they 
decide are those with a great importance in which 
the law is absent or unclear (McHugh, 1988, p. 
40). Therefore the intermediate Court’s job is 
more concerned with the application of the actual 
principles and their possibility of generating a 
rule of conduct depends on the inexistence of a 
precedent and an statute (McHugh, 1988, p. 40).
In this context, eventhougth that subsequent 
Courts thought the years has same hierarchy 
(Speaking of the higher ones) than the ancient 
ones, for the stability of the system, is paramount 
to avoid sudden changes in the rule of law or the 
precedent because the members of a community 
usually change their behavior to accommodate 
themselves to the rule of law, and if there is no 
clarity or stability in the system, the entire social 
environment suffers. Therefore the High Courts, 
which are at the top of the Court hierarchy, must 
be very careful when deciding to overrule a prec-
edent (Humbarita, 2015).
Judges’ methods of generating a precedent
Judges’ generate binding rules of conduct in 
two ways: under a step-by-step procurement, or 
by making sudden changes based on changes in 
the society premises.
The first one is preferred by the judges because 
it benefits the system stability: “It may sometimes 
be best for the courts to move to the best possible 
rule in steps, even at the price of inconsistency 
during the transition. (...) For example, a court 
may believe that a rule adopted in precedent is not 
even reasonably good and yet may not be confi-
dent that its belief is correct.” (Eisenberg, 2007, 
p. 96) In this context a step by step process allows 
the Court to gradually adapt to the reality of the 
community in accordance with the society’s stan-
dards and beliefs. 
For example, the evolution of the product 
liability law in Australia started in 1816 with 
Dixon v Bell, and after more than hundred years 
of legal evolution, the best rule of law was created 
and recognized by the Parliament under the form 
of an statute after an strong evolution: Langridge 
v Levy 1837, Winterbottom v Wrigth 1842, Long-
meid v Holliday 1851, George v Skivington 1869, 
Heaven v Pender 1883), the law was stated with 
Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 and then finally by the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Pt VA (Dixon B., 
2019).
In contrast, sudden changes are more contro-
versial because the rule of conduct is not a product 
of years of the society evolution interpreted by 
the judges, but a decision or precedent created 
abruptly. Therefore, its legality and acceptability 
depends on the correct interpretation that the 
judge does of a specific change in the society 
(García & Fino, 2014; Quiroz, 2014).
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One example of the sudden change in family 
law, when the values and beliefs of society 
changes, is related to the rights of the women in a 
marriage: the ancient law used to established that 
“the husband so it was said, had a property in the 
body, and a right to personal enjoyment of his wife, 
for the invasion of which right the law permitted 
him to sue as husband” (Dixon B., 2019) (Stein-
wall, 2003). 
It was recognized by the law that married 
men had better rights than the woman’s upon 
marriage. However, when equalitarian principles 
were developed in society, the idea of family and 
marriage changed in the sense that the ancient 
rule of law was not valid, so, even there was not a 
step by step process, a new rule of law was under 
construction: if a husband could bring such an 
action (sue his wife if she refused to intercourse 
with him), so could the wives, because even there 
was an ancient social proposition which justified 
it, was no longer defendable (Eisenberg M. A., 
2007, p. 99).
The Court recognized the change in society 
and, as a way of precedent, created a new rule 
“The High Court held that, despite earlier English 
authority to the contrary, the presumption that, 
upon marriage, a wife gave to her husband irre-
vocable consent to sexual intercourse could not be 
reconciled with modern attitudes” (Eisenberg M. 
A., 2007).
However, sometimes, sudden changes in the 
law can produce social alterations that are not 
often well received; they are criticized and divide 
society. Examples of Australian decisions that had 
been criticised, as product of so-called “judicial 
activism”, include the development of an implied 
Constitutional right to freedom of political 
communication [Australian Capital Television 
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 1], 
the reversal of the previously accepted doctrine 
of terra nullius and acceptance of the continued 
existence of rights to native titles in the aborig-
inal peoples of Australia, [Mabo v Queensland 
(No2) (1992) 175 CLR 1] and the acceptance of 
the effective right of an indigent person to legal 
representation in a trial, for a serious criminal 
offense as an essential element of the right to a fair 
trial [Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292]. (McHugh, 
1988, p. 41) (Kirby, 2007, p. 249).
Legitimacy of the law made by judges
The legitimacy of a binding rule made by a 
Court in a Common Law system depends on 
the social acceptance of that rule, since the rule 
is created without any kind of representation 
(Simpson, 1986).
The judicial creation of law is determined by 
four fundamental ideas: “(1) Courts should make 
law concerning private conduct in areas where the 
legislature has no acted, (2) the principles of legal 
reasoning turn on the interplay between doctrinal 
propositions and social propositions, (3) Legal 
rules can be justified only by social propositions, 
(4) consistency in the Common Law depends on 
social propositions” (Eisenberg M. A., 2007, p. 81).
Taking into account the first principle, judges 
can only generate laws in the private field. Since 
the policy making task is a restricted competence 
of the parliament, it is prohibited to the judges 
interfere in the public areas of the law. (Eisen-
berg M. A., 2007, p. 81) Therefore “The courts 
in a Common Law system have two main tasks, 
the first one is to solve the disputes that the society 
has in their private relationships and, secondly, 
to create rules that control the duties and rights 
of the members of the society” (Eisenberg M. A., 
2007, p. 81). 
By doing this, Courts make the law evolve 
according with the society changes, when there 
is not parliamentarian intervention “(…) much 
of that capacity [of the legislative power] must be 
allocated to the production of public-law rules 
and to matters such as budgets, taxation, govern-
mental organization, and public administration” 
(Eisenberg M. A., 2007).
Concerning the second principle, it is impor-
tant to make a distinction between the doctrinal 
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and the social propositions as well as how they 
determine the legitimacy of the law. Doctrinal 
propositions are “(1) the official text (report) which 
has the ratio and constitutes the precedent, (2) the 
precedents or statutes of similar law systems that 
can be applied by analogy, (3) the rest of the text 
produced by professionals in law” (Eisenberg M. A., 
2007).
The doctrinal propositions have to interact 
with society’s propositions to find if it is a good 
rule for the society. This interaction is the base 
from which new rules are generated by judges. For 
this to be done, the judge who is creating a new 
rule of conduct has “[To] take into account only (1) 
moral standards that claim to be rooted in aspira-
tion for the community as a whole (…); (2) policies 
that claim to characterize states of affairs as good 
for the community as a whole and have comparable 
support; and (3) experiential propositions that are 
supported, or appear to be supported, by the weight 
of informed opinion” (Eisenberg M. A., 2007, p. 83).
In this context, to create a rule of conduct, 
judges must interpret society, identify its main 
values and generate the best law accordingly, as 
long as there is not an applicable statute or perti-
nent precedent. Nevertheless “Formulating the 
governing principle or rule in a case sometimes 
involves a law-making function on the part of the 
judge, and it is often social, economic and even 
political factors stimulate or dictate the terms of 
this lawmaking function” (McHugh, 1988, p. 38). 
Though the good rule of law is that one made 
by that judge which really understood the social 
reality and solve a problem of it “The legitimacy 
of a Law made by a judge without representation 
depends on the coherence of the interpretation that 
the judge does of both the doctrinal and the social 
propositions”. (Eisenberg M. A., 2007) A doctrinal 
rule should be consistently applied and extended 
if it is the best possible rule because it is fully 
congruent with social propositions. 
A doctrinal rule should also be consistently 
applied and extended “(...) if it is a reasonably good 
rule because it is substantially congruent with the 
social proposition. However, a doctrinal rule should 
not be consistently applied and extended if it is a 
poor rule” (Eisenberg M. A., 2007, p. 86).
Taking into account the system coherence and 
stability, even the judge thinks of a very good new 
law, it is preferred by the judges not to overrule a 
principle or authority as soon as is reasonably good 
(Eisenberg M. A., 2007, p. 87) proved by a gradual 
development of the law. “The existence of this level 
of discretion is one of the reasons why it is essen-
tial for the judiciary to identify the values which are 
being recognised in individual cases and explain 
candidly why those values justify a development in 
the law” (McHugh, 1988, p. 42). 
In conclusion, judges have the important duty 
as part of their supplementary legislative role, to 
analyze the social environment and make evolve 
the law (doctrinal proposition) according to the 
social principles (social proposition) (McHugh, 
1988, p. 42).
Problems with judge’s law making 
prerogative in Australia
a. Division of powers
The first problem is concerned with the divi-
sion of powers. “It is almost unnecessary to tell 
you that the unsolved question of exactly what is 
judicial power and what are its limitations has 
received no answer in Australia” (Dixon O., 1942, 
p. 6).
The critics said that the creation of the law is 
a task that should be undertaken by parliament 
and not judges. Moreover, when judges make law 
while they should be doing justice, they are acting 
in breach of the division of powers and usurping 
the legislative duties in policy creation which is 
prohibited by the constitution. Since judge’s duty 
is with justice, there is a fundamental difference 
with the legislative duties. So they should not 
create binding rule of conduct but only apply 
justice to a specific case. Finally, even law creation 
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duty is not prohibited for the judges, that prerog-
ative it is not recognized in the Constitution, so 
its applicability is under discussion (Patarroyo & 
Benavides, 2014).
b. Instability of the rule of law 
Constant changes in the rule of law, make the 
system unstable. When the people do not know 
the rules they cannot change their behavior 
accordingly to fit the law. Therefore, the effec-
tiveness of the law, as a model of conduct, is 
compromised: “Sir Owen Dixon plainly believed 
that the common law judicial method was not 
compatible with a judge altering a legal rule or 
principle because it no longer meets or conforms 
to existing social needs. Change in legal princi-
ples had to be generated from existing doctrine” 
(McHugh, 1988, p. 38).
As Australia was an English colony, all the 
ancient precedents were applied the same in both 
countries. Nevertheless, after Australia became 
a country but himself, judicial independence 
from England was necessary, thus English prece-
dents were no longer legally binding in Australia. 
As such, the Australian Courts then had a wide 
berth and were able to act and created new law 
that changed customs and rules. This contributed 
to the instability of the law according to some 
authors (Heydon, 2003, p. 14).
Under the described Australian experience, 
in order to preserve system stability, law must be 
undertaken through a step-by-step process and 
not by any sudden change, to grant that is the best 
rule of conduct or at least the most reasonable 
one, (McHugh, 1988, p. 82) and only if a suddenly 
change is necessary as a cause of a change of the 
social proposition, this change of the rule of law 
must be done by a Court that respects its earlier 
decisions and departs from them to create a new 
rule (McHugh, 1988, p. 82) “Though Sir Owen 
Dixon did not think that the law could never 
change, he was of the view, which remains the law, 
that the change could not be generated by a court 
bound by the earlier decisions of courts superior 
in the hierarchy – only by a court which, while 
respecting its own earlier decisions, was free to 
depart from them” (McHugh, 1988, p. 82). 
However, the suddenly changes could be influ-
enced from other element rather than law and 
justice. Judges’ desires to make history and appear 
in the newspapers can produce suddenly changes 
in the precedent that are against the probity and 
stability of the system, “That is one core element 
in the ‘rule of law’. (…) The rule of law prevents 
citizens being exposed to the uncontrolled deci-
sions of others in conflict with them” (McHugh, 
1988, p. 82).
According to the previous statement, ‘judi-
cial activism’ (understood as the excessive law 
making process done by judges without respect 
the step by step process or correctly interpret 
the social proposition) is destroying the rule of 
law in Australia accordingly with some critics. 
(McHugh, 1988, p. 81) The logic, coherence, 
structure, order, and technique that the Common 
Law system possesses, thanks to its gradual 
development, it’s being broken down by sudden 
changes. (McHugh, 1988) Therefore, the court 
must be careful and only overrule a precedent 
in outstanding situations (Kirby, Precedent Law 
Practice and Trends in Australia, 2007, p. 247).
For that reason in order to overrule a prece-
dent without social alteration or incur in judicial 
activism and to grant the judges are changing the 
law for the good reasons, it is necessary for the 
Court to demonstrate that: (i) the ancient prec-
edent was per incuriam, (ii) make a contrast 
between the principles of the ancient rule with 
the principles that the court intend to include and 
decide if that change is desirable, (iii) consider 
how the new rule is going to affect the society, 
and (iv) if the new rule is more just and better 
resolves the conflict (Grundell, 2011).
c. Impartiality
Another problem is that judges are less impar-
tial if they are aiming to generate a rule of conduct 
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rather than trying to achieve the best and fairest 
result in the case. “A key factor in the speedy and 
just resolution of disputes is the disinterested 
application by the judge of known law drawn 
from existing and discoverable legal sources inde-
pendently of the personal beliefs of the judge” 
(Heydon, Judicial Activism and the Death of the 
Rule of Law, 2003, p. 14).
d. Making law when they are interpreting
When a statute is not clear, it is necessary to 
interpret it. The problem is that, occasionally, 
when the Court makes an interpretation of a 
statute, it changes the meaning, either adding or 
removing parts from it (Rodríguez, 2016).
Under the Australian Common Law system, 
it is forbidden for the Court to change a statute 
under the principle of legislative sovereign. Stat-
utes are clear expressions of the legislative power 
in which the Court cannot interfere. Conse-
quently if Courts change or remove parts from 
a statute, they are usurping parliamentary func-
tions. 
Therefore, in Australia, Courts must be very 
strict with in the application of the Interpretation 
Act 1901 and only make the statute under-
standable without adding or removing anything 
(Grundell, 2011).
e. Complexity of the system means it is 
harder to find a rule
Another criticism is that judges, focusing on 
their role of law-makers, are making complex 
decisions. This means that it is almost impossible 
to find the ratio or the binding rule:
“Thirty years ago, a typical civil case 
would produce an ex tempore judgment of 
three or four pages. Now such judgments 
are commonly reserved, and are ten or a 
hundred times longer. Indeed, in all courts, 
ex tempore judgments are rarer, and so are 
short judgments (...) it seems hard to locate 
what is crucially important, easy to concen-
trate on what is marginal (Heydon, Judicial 
Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law, 
2003, p. 14).
If the judgement is complex and the ratio it is 
not easily found, that generates a panic to parts 
involved in the litigation in missing something 
relevant to the case.
When judges are focusing in the law making 
process rather than to solve the controversy, they 
tend to produce complex decisions. This prac-
tice makes the ratio finding a lot harder which, in 
fact, generates problems to lawyers and clients to 
know and understand which the applicable law is.
This complexity helped ‘judicial activism’ to 
destroy the rule of law and constituted an assault 
on the probity that judges must have. “This rising 
public addiction to increasingly complex liti-
gation has also tended to facilitate the role of 
judicial activism in damaging both the probity of 
the courts and in consequence the capacity of the 
courts to retain a sound grip on the applicable law 
in particular cases” (Heydon, Judicial Activism 
and the Death of the Rule of Law, 2003, p. 14).
In conclusion, the gradual evolution of the 
precedent causes no disturbance in the law, but 
sudden changes do. Judicial activism is related to 
sudden changes in the precedent, but not with 
the step-by-step process of ‘law making ’(Rodrí-
guez, 2014; Palomares, 2015)
Limits for the judges when they make law
Although gradual evolution is not a problem 
in relation to judicial activism, judges have limits 
when they are making law. These limits must be 
respected in both types of law creation in order 
to judges not interfere into the legislative sphere. 
(McHugh, 1988, p. 43). 
Within these limitations judges are able to 
create law without interfering with the legis-
lative power or contradict the Parliamentary 
supremacy: “First, courts only make law in the 
context of determining legal dispute which is initi-
ated by the parties to dispute” (McHugh, 1988, 
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p. 43). Judges do not produce general rules that 
determine policy. They are limited to the case 
facts and only generate a precedent to solve similar 
cases. Therefore, in doing so, they are not creating 
a policy (Quintero & Molina, 2013)
The second limitation for the judges is the 
stability of the rule of law which implies that 
the rule should not be change so often, because 
constant changes in the law generate distrust in 
the legal system. For example, “the natural incli-
nation of most judges is to place a premium or 
certainty and predictability which are impor-
tant legal characteristics of a stable legal system. 
Stability instills confidence in the institution of the 
judiciary and in the law”. (McHugh, 1988, p. 43)
Judges should change the law only when the 
social proposition changes and when a change in 
the doctrinal proposition is required to adapt the 
law to the new social environment, “judges make 
law only when changes in society require the law 
to be developed to meet the consequences of those 
changes”. (Eisenberg M. A., 2007, p. 92) Also, the 
change can only be undertaken when the judiciary 
receives a case that sufficiently proves the exis-
tence of a need for change in society. (McHugh, 
1988, p. 44) Finally, and not less important, it is 
prohibited for the judges to make law when they 
are interpreting a statute (Sarmiento, Medina, & 
Plazas, 2017).
Conclusions
Understood from a Civil Law perspective, 
Common Law judges have a subsidiary law 
making power that provides a way of adapting 
the law to the social reality without the required 
term that the Congress takes to produce a law. 
This work would not be possible without under-
standing the legal context in which the societal 
changes have been developing. The “BARS” 
create cohesion and stability for legal precedents 
in order to make the system coherent.
The modification of standard of conduct, in 
many cases, happens by a gradual evolution that 
involves an analysis and interpretation of society 
over a long period of time. By doing this judges 
can achieve the most effective rule of law for the 
whole of society. Sudden changes in the law made 
by judges are the exception and only occur when 
there is an abrupt change in society that justifies 
overruling the precedent.
However, it is necessary to note that the 
subsidiary work of law creation that is done by 
judges is subject to parliamentary supremacy. 
This means that judges cannot, for example, 
generate laws that go against positive legislation 
made by parliament or modify a particular provi-
sion by means of normative interpretation.
This process, subject to strong limitations 
and departing from the special characteristics 
and order that describe the common law legal 
system, permits the coherence of it. Therefore 
when another legal system with a different social 
characteristics implant those legal constructions 
could generate a problem because the misap-
plication of it without taking into account its 
limitation, produces the destruction of the rule of 
law and the confidence in the system. 
Understanding how this very special type 
of legal creation works under Common Law 
provides us with tools to analyze the limits that 
courts should have in other legal systems (such 
as Colombia). In some of this countries courts 
generate rules of conduct without restrictions, 
respect for parliament or the legal context of the 
Common Law system, generating an instability 
that requires a fundamental legal change.
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